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A commentary on
Mind wandering “Ahas” versus mindful reasoning: alternative routes to creative solutions
by Zedelius, C. M., and Schooler, J. W. (2015). Front. Psychol. 6:834. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00834
What are the conditions under which a mental state such as mind wandering can help problem
solving? By addressing this question, Zedelius and Schooler (2015) contribute to our understanding
of the dynamics between distinct modes of thinking (i.e., mindfulness vs. mind wandering)
and different kinds of problem solving (i.e., analytic strategy vs. insight learning). To place this
important contribution within a wider context, it is important to appreciate that the contents
composing the “conscious field,” defined here as all that one is aware of at one moment in
time, are, in most cases, generated by sophisticated processes transpiring beneath the horizon
of consciousness (Morsella et al., in press). For example, to the self, the color of objects, depth
perception, urges, and dream content “just happen.” Accordingly, Helmholtz (1856/1925) speaks
of such conscious contents as arising from “unconscious inferences,” which, for him, include even
high-level contents, such as the phonological forms activated by automatic word reading.
If unconscious inferences engender the vast majority of conscious contents, including low-level
contents (e.g., nausea) and high-level contents (e.g., automatic word reading and “earworms”), then
why is the Aha-experience so special and, to the self, so startling? It seems that the Aha-experience
is special for reasons other than its being involuntary and sophisticated, which are properties shared
by other unconscious inferences. The findings reported by Zedelius and Schooler (2015) begin to
illuminate these properties and also the underlying mechanisms and conditions responsible for
them.
That Aha-experiences are engendered in a manner resembling that of most other conscious
contents can be appreciated in the following dream scenario, which was experienced by one of us
(EM). One is dreaming that one is seated at a desk, trying to title a piece of work, but is distracted
by an incessant earworm. After some time, and despite the earworm, a solution springs to mind. In
this example, it is evident that, though the Aha-experience is linked to only one conscious content
(the thought of the title), that content is not the only content that is generated by unconscious,
sophisticated processes: The percept of the desk, the urge to title the work, and the undesired
earworm all “just happen” to the self in the dream (Morsella et al., in press). In terms of the
intentional nature of their creation, these contents are the same.
From this standpoint, the color of an apple, which is traditionally regarded as
“stimulus driven,” and, say, becoming annoyed upon hearing a silly comment, are
similar regarding the unintentional nature of the introduction of these contents into
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the conscious field. Yet, the former is regarded as a property of
a stimulus, and the latter is not. Instead, the latter is regarded as
being more than that—as one’s response to a stimulus. This lay
intuition suggests that the feeling of annoyance was generated in
a manner that is more intentional than that of the perception of
the color red. But this is not the case: both contents “just happen”
to the self.
Because of insuppressible, unconscious inferences, conscious
contents often stem directly from the immediate environment
and seldom from long, complicated chains of thought.
Accordingly, in several studies (see Godwin et al., 2013),
subjects performed a concentration exercise (9 min) requiring
them to focus on their breathing. During this task, they also
had to observe spontaneous thoughts and count the number
of cognitions/percepts (“links”) that they believed led to each
spontaneous thought. On average, subjects reported less than
two links per thought, and over 80% of the thoughts were
attributed to a known cause. Important for present purposes,
roughly half of the thoughts were attributed to stimuli in the
present environment.
To place the contribution by Zedelius and Schooler (2015)
within a wider context, it is also important to appreciate
that, even when problem solving does not involve an Aha-
experience, and stems from intentional, directed thought (e.g.,
analytic strategy), the problem solving still stems in part from
sophisticated, unconscious processes, which are never mediated
consciously. A good analogy involves the control of action. One
is never conscious of the sophisticated patterns of efference to
the muscles (Jeannerod, 2006), even when first executing an
action, when the action is believed to be the most “consciously
mediated.” (Well-learned, repeated actions are regarded as
being less consciously-mediated.) For example, for both the
novice piano player and the expert pianist, the motor efference
responsible for the playing of each note is always consciously-
impenetrable. Similarly, each content composing a stream of
consciousness, whether the stream is mind wandering or directed
thought, stems in large part from processes that are consciously-
impenetrable (e.g., lexical retrieval and syntax; Merrick et al.,
2015).
Of course, one can influence content generation through
sophisticated techniques such as indirect cognitive control
(Morsella et al., 2009), such as when one imagines something
scary in order to induce fear, whose generation is usually
encapsulated. Similarly, one can impede the generation of a
particular conscious content (e.g., an earworm) by intentionally
occupying its content generator with some other activity (e.g.,
reciting a poem). (Research reveals that such a strategy is
limited; Cho et al., 2014.) This blocking effect might contribute
to the finding by Zedelius and Schooler (2015) that high
levels of mindfulness (toward some content) interfere with the
generation of out-of-the-blue contents, such as those associated
with Aha-experiences. Nevertheless, techniques such as indirect
cognitive control occur usually only in adult humans and are
the exception rather than the rule regarding the nature of
content generation. Most conscious contents “just happen.” For
reasons yet to be specified, they are not accompanied by any
Aha-experiences.
To answer the question posed in our title, Aha-experiences
are special, but for reasons other than the unintentional and
sophisticated nature of their generation. The groundbreaking
research by Zedelius and Schooler (2015) begins to illuminate
what is special about these peculiar conscious contents and
how their generation depends upon certain factors (e.g., low
mindfulness and high mind wandering).
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